Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Secretary, appreciate your testimony. Very valuable, today.

With respect to the question that Senator Obama asked, and the

letter that was sent to me, I’d just like to make sure that Senator

Obama understands that the letter that was sent in reply to my

question did leave open this whole issue of the federal system division

of responsibilities between the executive and the legislative

branches, which is why I decided to introduce the legislation that

I did. So, I just wanted to Senator Obama to understand that.

The key question really, constitutionally, is whether general operations

in Iran, as opposed to specific reactions to tactical situations,

would be considered the commencement of a war, rather

than an extension of the President’s powers that were already

granted to him by other congressional authorization; and, if not,

whether he has that power, as the Commander in Chief. And it’s

a—it is a very complicated area. It’s probably—a very difficult area

to answer in a letter, which is why I decided to put something in

legislation, just to clarify, from the view of the Congress, if the legislation

passes, where we believe one set of authorities end and another begin.

I would like to go into a couple of other areas in the short time that I have here.

The first is, watching your exchange with the Senator from Minnesota,

I was sitting here remembering that, 20 years ago, when

I was Secretary of the Navy, I was at a—present at the creation

of this whole attempt to develop a strategy when people were looking

at the future of Iranian potential expansion under this regime.

There were a number of people in the Government at that time

who were talking about what they were calling a Pan-Arab strategy,

sort of a desire to, in effect, contain Iran. And that resulted

in the tilt toward Iraq during the middle of the Iran-Iraq war. And

I think I may have been the only member of the Reagan administration

who opposed the tilt toward Iraq in writing, for many of the

same reasons, that I had great concerns about the notion of invading

Iraq, rather than attempting to deal with that situation in a

lot different way and allowing us to focus more heavily on international terrorism.

And—I feel compelled to say this because of the exchange that

was going on with the Senator from Minnesota.—I strongly believe

that the occupation of Iraq has basically worsened this concern

with respect to Iran, not alleviated it. I think that, as many people

predicted, as—we have seen Iran empowered as a result.

And so, the question becomes: What do we do from here? Where

do we go? How do we deal with this situation? And I have been

very gratified over the past few months about how Secretary Rice

has stepped up and—I know the administration wouldn’t say this—

but has, I think, begun to take the level of diplomacy to a higher

instrument of concern, in terms of policy.

And my view on—my concern about where the executive power

ends, in terms of use of force, does not reduce the concern that I,

and other people, have about the situation in Iran. And I’ve been

following, as best I can, the impact of the sanctions that have been

put on Iran. I think The Economist did a really fine job outlining

the strong impact of these sanctions; an article that they had in

February—one of the February issues. And to me, the worst thing

you can do in these kinds of situations is to rattle the saber to the

point that an authoritarian government can use it to bring people

inside the country to its side, where, otherwise, they would not be,

that the proper use of sanctions does two things. One is that it isolates

the leadership from its own people. And we tend to forget

that. And then, the second thing is that it can isolate a regime

from most of the rest of the world. And, you know, we—your testimony

talking about thinking people in the Iranian Government not

wanting to end up in the situation of North Korea, I think, is right

on point. But would you care to comment on that?

If I may, on that, I—because we don’t have a lot

of time—I—the concern that I, and a number of people, have is

that the option of a general strike against Iran is not, in the view

of many people in the Congress, an option that this President has

without coming to the Congress. And this is the—sort of, the dividing

line where we continue to have this debate.

But you would agree that these sorts of sanctions

tend to isolate this type of government from its own people. I think

it’s important for Americans to understand that.

Well, I’ve been watching words. I’m a writer. You

know, I’ve been watching words, and we keep talking about Iran,

Iran, Iran. And I think if you watched what the Chinese did in the

early 1970s, they were very smart, talking about the American

Government and the American people. I mean, let’s just accept the

fact that they were very smart about it. And we need to start doing that, as well.

I’m running out of time. I would like, in brief form, to get your

thoughts about the results of the indirect multilateral talks that occurred

in Baghdad, as it might impact confidence-building and a

new approach to relations with Iran.

But a useful——

Confidence-builder. Thank you.

Senator Lugar, I believe I have the

chair. Were there any other business to be conducted? Oh, I’m

sorry, Senator Voinovich; did not see you.